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Abstract
This Article discusses what the United States can do to promote the rule of law and human
rights in DR Congo. This Article contends that U.S.-DR Congo policy has been formulated in
dribs and drabs, limited in quantity relative to the enormity of the crisis, and without an overarch-
ing plan for promoting legal coherence and yielding long-term, systemic change. To be effective,
U.S.-Congolese policy must be crafted and executed with a holistic approach-security, disarma-
ment, infrastructure, food assistance, and health care must all undergird greater efforts to establish
the rule of law. In effect, the United States must initiate an “African Marshall Plan”-a massive
resource and assistance infusion to bring about wide-ranging, organic change and secure the ben-
efits of DR Congo’s free elections and the recent Nairobi/Goma peace process. To implement
such an African Marshall Plan this Article advocates both procedural and substantive changes in
U.S. policy toward DR Congo. Part I of the Article will place current U.S. policy in context by
examining the United States’ role in Congo’s post-independence human rights debacle-its support
of Mobutu and its shifting alliances in the African Great Lakes Region after the Cold War. Part
II will consider DR Congo’s continuing human rights problems after elections in 2006 and recent
American piecemeal efforts to contribute to the country’s peace and rebuilding process. Finally,
Part III will analyze recommended changes in U.S. policy necessary to curb the ubiquitous vio-
lence and ingrained culture of impunity in DR Congo. These recommended alterations are both
procedural and substantive.
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INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 1998, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
("DR Congo") became engulfed in a five-year war that turned
out to be the deadliest armed conflict since World War II.1 In
fact, many have referred to it as Africa's "First World War."2 A
2007 mortality report from the International Rescue Committee
says that as many as 5.4 million people have died from war-re-
lated causes in DR Congo since 1998.' Despite a 2003 peace
deal and the country's first elections in over forty years being
held in 2006, 4 a staggering 45,000 people continue to die each
* © 2009. Assistant Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law. This Arti-
cle was drafted in connection with the 2008 International Peace Research Association's
Annual Meeting at K.U. Leuven in Belgium. It was presented at a round-table on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo ("DR Congo") organized by KU. Leuven Re-
searcher Jean Migabo Kalere. I am indebted to K.U. Leuven and Mr. Kalere, as well as
K.U. Leuven Professors Luc Reychelles (Secretary-General of IPRA) and Stephen Par-
mentier (Head, Dep't of Criminal Law and Criminology). I am equally grateful to my
talented Research Assistant, Justin Keppinger. I would also like to thank Diana
Ohlbaum and Dolph Hellman for their invaluable commentary.
1. See Conflict in Congo Deadliest Since World War II, Says the IRC, INT'L RESCUE
COMM., Apr. 8, 2003, http://www.theirc.org/news/conflict in-congo-deadliestsince_
world war iisaystheirc.html (lasted visited Apr. 19, 2009).
2. See Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEo. L.J. 939, 970 (2005)
(indicating that Madeleine Albright and others have referred to the ongoing five-nation
bloodbath in Congo (Kinshasa) as Africa's "First World War").
3. See INT'L RESCUE COMM., MORTALITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO:
AN ONGOING CRIsIs 16 (2007), available at http://www.theirc.org/resources/2007/
2006-7_congomortalitysurvey.pdf; see also IRC Study Shows Congo's Neglected Crisis Leaves
5.4 Million Dead, INT'L RESCUE COMMI-rEE, Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.theirc.org/news/
irc-study-shows-congos0122.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).
4. See Franco Henwood, The DR Congo: Moving Beyond the Bullet and Ballot Box, in
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: FROM PEACE RHETORIC To SUSTAINABLE POLITI-
CAL STABILITY? 31 (Jideofor Adibe & Henri Boshoff eds., 2007).
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month, both from the conflict and the related humanitarian cri-
sis.5 Women are being raped in unimaginable numbers-as
many as 4000 reported cases per year 6 -while militia groups
fight amongst one another and torture, enslave, and murder ci-
vilians for control and exploitation of mineral resources.7 The
years of warfare have forced six million from their homes.' The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has estimated
"the huge central African country has 1.1 million internally dis-
placed people and a further 400,000 have fled abroad."9
Thirty-eight years before the outbreak of this humanitarian
disaster, the country had been trying to imagine a bright future
after holding its first free elections as an independent nation.10
Patrice Lumumba was elected Prime Minister and began to steer
the country on a course of reform after seventy-five years of disas-
trous Belgian colonial rule. 1 But Lumumba, who sought aid
from the Soviet Union, 2 was considered a threat to the United
States' regional interests in the Cold War. 3 And so with Ameri-
can and Belgian direction and backing, Lumumba was over-
thrown and killed. 4 Army Colonel Joseph Mobutu (who would
5. See Chris McGreal, War in Congo Kills 45,000 People Each Month, GUARDIAN
(London),Jan. 23, 2008, at 19.
6. See World Food Programme, Information Note on WFP Assistance to Internally Dis-
placed Persons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 7, WFP Doc. WFP/EB.1/2004/6-B/
2 (Feb. 23-27, 2004), available at http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/
documents/eb/wfp024428.pdf; see also Chris McGreal, Hundreds of Thousands Raped in
Congo Wars, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 14, 2006, at 19.
7. See Aaron Ezekiel, The Application of International Criminal Law to Resource Exploita-
tion: Ituri, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 47 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 225, 227 (2007) (noting
that crimes "include forced labor, kidnapping, mass rape and sexual slavery, mutilation,
and mass murder (possibly meeting the definition of genocide in some ethnically based
instances).").
8. See Six Million Congolese Displaced by War-Minister, REUTERS, July 29, 2007, availa-
ble at http://uk.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUKL2936739920070729.
9. Id.
10. See GEORGES NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, THE CONGO FROM LEOPOLD TO KABILA: A
PEOPLE'S HISTORY 94 (2002).
11. See id. For a discussion on Belgium's colonial rule over present-day Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the ensuing Congolese resistance, see id. at 13-54.
12. Contrary to popular belief, Lumumba at first sought aid from the United
States, not the Soviet Union. See SEAN KELLY, AMERICA'S TYRANT: THE CIA A.D MOBUTU
OF ZAMRE 28 (1993). To extricate the country from colonial control, however,
Lumumba approached the Soviet Union for assistance. Id. at 29. Lumumba did not
embrace communism. Id. at 49. In fact, he believed his country should avoid picking
sides between East and West because he rejected both colonialism and communism. Id.
13. See id. at 106.
14. See id. at 95.
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later change his name to "Mobutu Sese Seko") eventually took
control of the government and launched a three-decade reign of
tyranny and kleptocracy from which the country is still trying to
recover.' 5 As noted above, it has been mired in armed conflict
ever since.1
6
Independent elections in 2006"7 and peace initiatives that
concluded last year in Nairobi"8 and Goma"9 have improved the
situation and given the country a modicum of hope for an end
to the violence and the development of the rule of law.20 But
this fragile state of affairs has not ended the mass atrocity and it
will not hold without significant outside assistance. 21 In this re-
gard, the United States, under the leadership of new President
Barack Obama, must play a decisive role. 22 Other potential do-
15. See id. at 141.
16. See generally Laurence Juma, The War in Congo: Transnational Conflict Networks
and the Failure of Internationalism, 10 GONz. J. INT'L L. 97 (2006) (describing the history
of conflict in DR Congo).
17. Joseph Kabila was elected president of DR Congo as a result of these elections.
See After Violent Decades, Congo Finally Installs an Elected Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at
A15.
18. The "Nairobi Communique," signed on November 9, 2007, is the joint docu-
ment signed by the Governments of DR Congo and the Republic of Rwanda for a com-
mon approach to end the threat posed to peace and stability in both countries and the
Great Lakes Region. See Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Se-
curity Council U.N. Doc. S/2007/679 (Nov. 21, 2007), available at http://daccessdds.
un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO7/609/65/PDF/NO760965.pdf?OpenElement (con-
taining the Nairobi Communiqu6); see also Alan Doss, A Briefing on the Congo by SRSG
[Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General in DR Congo] Alan
Doss (Apr. 16, 2008), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ondemand/index.cfm?fuseaction=
Media.play&mediaid=C57D0038-DDOE-4CD8-4109AF103870EB5F (video available on
website) [hereinafter Congo Briefing].
19. The "Goma Agreement" was the result of the Goma conference on peace, se-
curity, and development for the Kivu provinces held this past January. The Acts of
Engagement which provided for an immediate ceasefire among the armed groups in
the area, demobilization of militias, and the acceleration of the peace process were
signed on January 23, 2008 by the DR Congo government and the armed groups. See
Ban Ki-Moon Hails Agreement to End Violence in Eastern DR Congo, U.N. NEWS SERVICE, Jan.
23, 2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25384&Cr=drc&Crl.
20. See UNICEF HUMANITARIAN ACTION, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO IN 2007,
at 2 (2006), available at http://www.unicef.org/har07/files/DRC.pdf [hereinafter
UNICEF DRC].
21. The primary assistors would likely be the United States, the European Union
("EU"), the African Union and the United Nations ("U.N."). See Congo Briefing, supra
note 18.
22. See Stewart Patrick, Policy Planning Staff Member, U.S. Dep't of State, The
Role of the U.S. Government in Humanitarian Intervention, Remarks to the 43rd An-
nual International Affairs Symposium, The Suffering of Strangers: Global Humanita-
rian Intervention in a Turbulent World (Apr. 5, 2004), available at http://2001-
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nors do not have the same capacity to deliver the necessary aid.
23
The European Union ("EU"), for example, due to various bu-
reaucratic and financial restraints, is limited in the extent of ef-
fective assistance it can render.2 4 The African Union has been
trying to keep the peace in Darfur, but has been lacking suffi-
cient money and supplies. 25 It is in no position to shoulder the
massive burden in DR Congo. Nor is the United Nations
("U.N."), which is overextended in the field of humanitarian as-
26sistance.
While the United States has at times exerted a positive influ-
ence in the DR Congo peace and rebuilding process in recent
years," its involvement has not been sufficient to bring about
2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/31299.htm (suggesting the dominant role played by the
United States in humanitarian assistance given that the United States alone was respon-
sible for one-third of all global humanitarian assistance in 2003).
23. It might be argued that, with current commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the United States is already stretched too thin to take on this commitment. See, e.g.,Jack
Spencer, Stretched Too Thin, HERITAGE FOUND., Aug. 7, 2003, http://www.heritage.org/
press/commentary/ed080703b.cfm. However, even under former President George W.
Bush there were good indications the United States would be pulling out of Iraq in the
near future. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush and McCain Seem to Diverge in Foreign Pol-
icy, WASH. POST, July 26, 2008, at A14. And President Obama has signaled his intent to
withdraw American troops from Iraq as soon as possible. See Peter Baker, With Pledges to
Troops and Iraqis, Obama Details Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2009, at A6. In any event,
many experts are calling for a renewed U.S. foreign policy that looks beyond Iraq and
Afghanistan and focuses on other regions in greater need of assistance. See generally
John Edwards, Reengaging with the World: A Return to Moral Leadership, 86 FOREIGN AFF.
19 (2007), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070901faessay86502/john-ed-
wards/reengaging-with-the-world.html.
24. See OPEN EUROPE, EU AiD: IS IT EFFEcnVE? 4 (2007), http://www.openeurope.
org.uk/research/euaid.doc (reporting that, due to slow delivery of aid and mismanage-
ment of funds, the European Union's foreign aid office, the European Commission,
has been described as "the worst development agency in the world"); see also KRISTIN
ARCHIK & PAUL GALLIS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
21 (2008), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32342.pdf (noting that EU
members have scarce defense budgets); Stephen Castle, Patten Threatens Cuts to EU's
Foreign Aid Budget, INDEP. (London), May 17, 2000, at 16 (indicating that the EU does
not have sufficient staff and expertise to distribute foreign aid money effectively).
25. See Colum Lynch, African Union Force Low on Money, Supplies and Morale, WASH.
POST, May 13, 2007, at A17.
26. See Dr. Subhash Kapila, United Nations Organisation at the Crossroads 1-2 (S. Asia
Analysis Group, Working Paper No. 1168, 2004), available at http://www.southasia
analysis.org/%5Cpapers 12%5Cpaperl 168.html (noting that the U.N. has deviated
from its primary role of preventing conflicts and overextended into various fields, in-
cluding humanitarian assistance).
27. See Exploring the U.S. Role in Consolidating Peace and Democracy in the Great Lakes
Region: Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on African Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Rela-
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lasting positive change.28 Many commentators have called on
the United States, with its contribution to the problems in DR
Congo and its enormous wealth and influence, to do much more
for the rule of law and respect for human rights to take firm root
and spread throughout this gargantuan, fractured polity29-one
that is the size of all of Western Europe.s° And with Barack
Obama poised to take U.S. foreign policy in new directions, the
time is ripe." l
But what exactly can the United States do to promote the
rule of law and human rights in DR Congo? This Article con-
tends that U.S.-DR Congo policy has been formulated in dribs
and drabs, limited in quantity relative to the enormity of the cri-
sis, and without an overarching plan for promoting legal coher-
ence and yielding long-term, systemic change. To be effective,
U.S.-Congolese policy must be crafted and executed with a holis-
tic approach-security, disarmament, infrastructure, food assis-
tance, and health care must all undergird greater efforts to es-
tablish the rule of law. In effect, the United States must initiate
an "African Marshall Plan"-a massive resource and assistance
infusion to bring about wide-ranging, organic change and secure
tions, I10th Cong. 3-6 (2007) [hereinafter Frazer] (statement ofJendayi E. Frazer, Assis-
tant Sec'y for Afr. Affairs, Dep't of State).
28. See Pierre Englebert, Life Support or Assisted Suicide? Dilemmas of U.S. Policy To-
wards the Democratic Republic of Congo, in SHORT OF THE GOAL: U.S. POLICY AND POORLY
PERFORMING STATES 53, 75 (Nancy Birdsall, Milan Vaishnav & Robert L. Ayres eds.,
2006) ("To some extent, the United States has tried to strengthen the Congolese state
ever since the early 1960s and has little to show for it."); Letter from Cynthia McKinney,
Member of Cong. and Member of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations (now H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs) and H. Comm. on Nat'l Sec. (now defunct), to President William J.
Clinton (Aug. 31, 1999), available at http://www.inshuti.org/mckinney.htm.
29. See, e.g., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, EASTERN CONGO POLICY STANDARD 1 (2008),
available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Congo%20Policy%2OStandard.pdf
[hereinafter POLICY STANDARD] (urging the United States "to increase funding for stabi-
lization programs"); Princeton N. Lyman, MONUC: A Case for Peacekeeping Reform, COUN-
CIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Mar. 1, 2005, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/
7881 ("The United States should invest much more diplomatically and with its re-
sources in support of the tenuous peace process under way."); Thomas Turner, War in
the Congo, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, Apr. 2000, at 2, available at http://www.fpif.org/
pdf/vol5/10ifcongo.pdf ("The U.S. bears significant responsibility for the conflict in
the Congo and therefore has an obligation to participate in its resolution.").
30. See Johann Hari, Congo's Tragedy: The War the World Forgot, INDEP. (London),
May 5, 2006, at 2.
31. See Katharine Zaleski & Hanna Ingber Win, Obama Foreign Policy Changes: World
Reactions, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/
22/obama-foreign-policy-chan-n 159983.html.
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the benefits of DR Congo's free elections and the recent Nai-
robi/Goma peace process. 2 To implement such an "African
Marshall Plan, 33 this Article advocates both procedural and sub-
stantive changes in U.S. policy toward DR Congo.
Part I of the Article will place current U.S. policy in context
by examining the United States' role in Congo's post-indepen-
dence human rights debacle-its support of Mobutu and its
shifting alliances in the African Great Lakes Region after the
Cold War. Part II will consider DR Congo's continuing human
rights problems after elections in 2006 and recent American
piecemeal efforts to contribute to the country's peace and re-
building process. Finally, Part III will analyze recommended
changes in U.S. policy necessary to curb the ubiquitous violence
and ingrained culture of impunity in DR Congo. These recom-
mended alterations are both procedural and substantive.
With respect to the procedural side, U.S. policy is currently
formulated by a smorgasbord of agencies in an ad hoc manner.34
Creation of a single Congo working group or agency with an in-
tegrated agenda and a presence on the ground will bring much
needed reform. It will allow the United States to formulate
benchmarks in assessing the human rights situation in the coun-
try and better identify potential external partners, such as the
EU, to end the atrocity crime wave in DR Congo. Moreover, us-
ing a U.S. ombudsman to assure that assistance is distributed by
non-corrupt persons in an effective manner on the ground will
32. The "Marshall Plan"-more formally known as the "European Recovery Pro-
gram"-was a project instituted by the United States after World War II to foster eco-
nomic recovery and promote peace in Europe. It took its form in aJune 5, 1947 speech
when U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall urged European countries to make deci-
sions regarding their "economic needs so that material and financial aid from the
United States could be integrated on a broad scale." Marshall Plan, in THE COLUMBIA
ENCYCLOPEDIA 106 (5th ed. 1993). The following year, President Truman created the
Economic Cooperation Administration to administer the program. From 1948-51, over
US$12 billion was dispersed to western European countries under the program. The
Marshall Plan greatly contributed to the economic recovery of Europe and helped pro-
mote peace and stability in the region. See id.
33. This would certainly not be an exact replica of the original Marshall Plan but
the term is used here to convey the notion of large-scale, holistic assistance to a region
that has recently been devastated by war. Although the entire continent would not
receive assistance under the plan, it is referred to as an "African" Marshall Plan because
of the geographic and political centrality of DR Congo to the entire continent.
34. See Robert A. Kagan, Trying To Have It Both Ways: Local Discretion, Central Con-
trol, and Adversarial Legalism in American Environmental Regulation, 25 EcoLocy L.Q. 718,
724-25 (1999).
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also be a necessary part of the reform effort. Finally, to guaran-
tee proper local coordination and efficiency, the United States
should establish a permanent cadre of expert on-the-ground
staff to sustain U.S. engagement in curbing human rights abuses
and establishing the rule of law.
Substantively, three important features of U.S. policy in pro-
moting the rule of law must be addressed: (1) eliminating the
so-called "negative forces" in the region, which entails militia dis-
armament, military integration of dissident groups, repatriation
of extremist Hutu forces, inclusion of Rwanda in the process,
and control of arms smuggling and illegal resource exploitation;
(2) building up essential institutions in DR Congo, which in-
cludes expanding, reforming and participating in the U.N.
peacekeeping mission (known by its French acronym,
"MONUC") ,5 creating a DR Congo domestic human rights advi-
sor office and a new Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and
building up civil society, especially in the justice sector; and (3)
ending impunity, which involves supporting the International
Criminal Court ("ICC"), domestic and possibly hybrid tribunal
prosecution efforts, and generally ensuring enforcement of
human rights and humanitarian law.
As Western Europe needed a massive infusion of American
assistance to lift itself from misery after World War II, DR Congo
needs such an investment now. Anything short of that will leave
it mired in its current predicament-the post-independence cy-
cle of violence and suffering. 36 This would ultimately plunge the
Great Lakes region of Africa,37 if not the entire continent, fur-
ther into the abyss. In this increasingly interconnected world, it
is clearly in the interests of the United States to prevent that out-
come. With the new administration of President Barack Obama
35. MONUC refers to the U.N. Mission in DR Congo, established by the U.N. Se-
curity Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. MONUC is the French acronym
for Mission de lOrganisation des Nations Unies en Rkpublique democratique du Congo. See
MONUC Mandate, http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newslD=11529&menuOpened=
About%20MONUC (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).
36. See generally NZONGOLA-NTA[AJA, supra note 10.
37. The term "African Great Lakes region" is typically used to describe the area in
the Great Rift Valley, lying between northern Lake Tanganyika, western Lake Victoria,
and Lakes Kivu, Edward and Albert. This roughly comprises Burundi, Rwanda, DR
Congo, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. See The Insider's Guide to Africas Great Lakes, CNN,
Dec. 15, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/12/14/insider.africagreat
lakes/index.html.
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poised to reformulate U.S. foreign policy, the time is ripe for a
new American initiative in DR Congo.
I. BACKGROUND: MOBUTU, AFRICAN WARS AND THE
PEACE PROCESS
A. The Cold War and the Rwandan Genocide
From the 1960s through the 1980s, U.S. policy in DR Congo
(known as Republic of Zaire from 1971-97), which entailed sup-
port of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, was shaped by the exigencies
of the Cold War.38 Support for Mobutu was disastrous for the
country, however. Resource extraction for personal gain, ram-
pant corruption, formation of a brutal police state, and the com-
plete disintegration of infrastructure were the result of thirty-two
years of Mobutu's autocratic rule.39
The end of the Cold War changed the U.S. political calculus
in the region and Mobutu looked to the French for support,4 °
while the United States began to consider the potential of other
partnerships in the Great Lakes Region-ultimately forming
ones with Uganda and Rwanda." By the beginning of 1994,
Rwanda had become the regional focus as two decades of rule by
Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana (also a French cli-
ent)42 was coming apart under the weight of economic problems
and ethnic pressure from a conflict between the majority Hutus
and the minority Tutsis-sparked by armed incursions by the
Rwandan Patriotic Front ("RPF"), an expatriate Tutsi military
force from Uganda."
Although the two sides attempted to form a compromise
government through the Arusha Accords, powerful extremist
Hutus were against this solution and an extremist Hutu militia,
38. See Henwood, supra note 4, at 30.
39. See Thierry Vircoulon, Beyond the Transition: The Agenda of Reconstruction and
Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO:
FROM PEACE RHETORIC To SUSTAINABLE POLITICAL STABILITY? 35 (Jideofor Adibe &
Henri Boshoff eds., 2007).
40. See Craig R. Whitney, As Mobutu Totters, France Ponders Options, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
15, 1997, at A4.
41. See Grard Prunier, Uganda: Nearly a Miracle, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Feb.
1998, available at http://mondediplo.com/1998/02/10uganda.
42. See Craig R. Whitney, Panel Finds French Errors in Judgment on Rwanda, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1998, at 17.
43. See ALISON DES FORGES, Hum. RTS. WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY 48-
51, 137-40 (1999).
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the Interahamwe, was being recruited, organized and armed with
machetes.44 On April 6, 1994, Habyarimana's airplane was shot
down as he returned from negotiations in Arusha and Hutu ex-
tremists launched a well-planned genocide that resulted in the
murder of approximately 800,000 Tutsis within a hundred days
and sent shock waves throughout the region.45
As the genocide was taking its grim course, the RPF (which
began to receive U.S. support)4 6 was winning on the battlefield
and the Rwandan Armed Forces (assisted by the French)4" be-
gan to retreat.48 Eventually, a mass exodus of Rwandan Hutus
poured over the borders into neighboring countries49 with a
large portion ending up in Zaire. ° Sprawling refugee camps,
funded by international aid agencies, crawling with Interahamwe
mass murderers, and controlled by g&ocidaire leaders,
mushroomed along the Rwanda-Zaire border.51  In the
meantime, relying in part on assistance from the United States,
44. See id. at 123-30.
45. See id. at 181-85, 199-216; MANUS I. MIDLA SKY, THE KILLING TRAP: GENOCIDE IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 5 (2005).
46.
The U.S., the most influential actor in Rwanda, provided relatively little finan-
cial aid, $7.6 million in development assistance and $500,000 for military train-
ing in 1998. But it gave steady political support that was highly valued by
Rwandan authorities. U.S. soldiers were training Rwandan troops just before
the RPA [Rwandan Patriotic Army] crossed into the DRC [DR Congo] in 1996
and again in 1998.
HUM. RTS. WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1999, at 66 (1998), available
at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/. The Rwandan Patriotic Army is
the military division of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. See ALAN J. KUPERMAN, LIMITS OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 9 (2001).
47. See DES FORGES, supra note 43, at 116-22.
48. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1995, at 40, 59
(1994), available at h ttp:/ /www.hrw.org/legacy/ reports/ 1995/WR95/ASIA-0 .h tm.
49. The Hutu refugees were helped by the French who established evacuation cor-
ridors as part of "Ophration Turquoise." See DES FORGES, supra note 43, at 668-90. This
mass exodus precipitated what is known as the "Great Lakes Refugee Crisis." See Am-
nesty Int'l, Great Lakes Region: Refugee Crisis Far From Over, Al Index AFR 02/09/97,
Sept. 2, 1997, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR02/009/
1997/en/4def6fa8-919c-44c1-8c89-1dbf941ded7c/afr020091997en.pdf.
50. See Gerald Caplan, Rwanda: Walking the Road to Genocide, in THE MEDIA AND
THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 20, 32 (Allan Thompson ed., 2007); see also DES FORGES, supra
note 43, at 685.
51. See ORG. OF AFR. UNITY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. OAU INT'L PANEL OF EMINENT
PERSONALITIES TO IN'VESTIGATE THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND THE SURROUNDING
EVENTS E.S.53-56 (2000), http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/rwanda/IPEPR
wanda.pdf [hereinafter OAU EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
1370 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:1361
the RPF consolidated its control over Rwanda.52 Also during this
time, the refugee camps in Zaire became armed bases for cross-
border killing missions into Rwanda, where ggnocidaire leaders
hoped to carry on their eliminationist mission, silence witnesses,
and destabilize RPF control over the country.53 In due course,
these leaders began to prepare for an invasion of Rwanda that
would defeat the RPF and restore to them control over the coun-
try.5
4
B. The First Civil War: 1996-1997
At the same time, new ethnic tensions were flaring up in the
eastern part of Zaire. Banyamulenge Tutsi (Zairian/Congolese
Tutsi) were coming under attack from the Hutu refugee camps
and were being subjected to various human rights violations by
the Zairian government, including loss of property, arrest, and
murder.55 Armed and assisted by the RPF (again, with U.S. sup-
port), the Banyamulenge launched attacks against the camps,
which ultimately resulted in their being dismantled, and then
they carried the fight towards Kinshasa.56 They were joined by
other disaffected groups, including leftists who had supported
Patrice Lumumba, as well as ethnic and regional minorities op-
posed to the dominance of the Kinshasa region.57
Laurent D~sir6 Kabila, an ethnic Katangese, former
Lumumba lieutenant, and leftist political leader, had been fight-
ing the Mobutu government for decades and became the leader
of the uprising that was starting to control large swaths of terri-
52. See ROBERT E. GRIBBIN, IN THE AFTERMATH OF GENOCIDE: THE U.S. ROLE IN
RWANDA 86 (2005).
53. See OAU EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 51, E.S.56.
54. See Oluoch-Ojiwah Fred, The Congo-Rwanda Bilateral Framework in the Last 30
Years, NEW TIMES (Rwanda), Feb. 26, 2009 (available on Lexis-Nexis).
55. See THOMAS TURNER, CONGO WARS: CONFLICT, MYTH & REALITY 89 (2007);J.L.
Collins, Congo/Zaire, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, June 1997, at 1, available at http://
www.fpif.org/pdf/vol2/37ifcong.pdf, see also OAU EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 51,
E.S.56.
56. See Guy Fiti Sinclair, Don't Mention the War (on Terror): Framing the Issues
and Ignoring the Obvious in the ICJ's 2005 Armed Activities Decision, 8 MELBOURNEJ.
INT'L L. 124, 126 (2007); see also OAU EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 51, 1 E.S.57.
57. See NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 10, at 225; David Orr, Guide to the Zaire Cri-
sis: Why We are Sending Thousands of Soldiers to Help Save the Refugees, INDEP. (London),
Nov. 16, 1996, at 10.
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tory in its march toward Kinshasa.5" Known as the Alliance des
Forces D~mocratiques pour la Lib6ration du Congo-Zaire ("AFDL"),
the rebellion was supported, militarily and financially, by
Rwanda and Uganda, 9 which, in turn, were both supported by
the United States.6 ° In the end, the AFDL toppled Mobutu and
the country's name was changed back to the "Democratic Re-
public of the Congo."61
The Banyamulenge and their Rwandan, Burundian, and
Ugandan allies counted on the Rwandan military for protection
against hostile armed groups operating in the eastern part of DR
Congo.62 These groups included:
(1) The Interahamwe;
(2) The former Rwandan Armed Forces ("RAF"), which
had fought the RPF during the Rwandan genocide;
(3) The Mai Mai, a rag-tag coalition of traditional Con-
golese local defense forces, which opposed the Rwandan incur-
sion;
(4) The Alliance of Democratic Forces ("AFDL"), consist-
ing of Ugandan expatriates who were fighting their motherland
with the support of the government of Sudan; and
(5) Various Burundian Hutu groups fighting the Tutsi-con-
trolled government of Burundi.63
The United States at first backed Kabila's government.64
But the support did not last. After gaining power, Kabila sought
independence from Rwanda and Uganda and asked them to re-
move their military contingents.65  Both countries refused.6 6
58. See Cindy Shiner, Kabila: Despot or Democrat? Accounts of Kabila's Odyssey Contra-
dictory, WASH. POST, May 19, 1997, at Al.
59. See generally BUREAU OF AFR. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE:
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (2009), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
ei/bgn/2823.htm [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTE].
60. See NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 10, at 227.
61. See OAU EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 51, E.S.57. At independence from
Belgium, present-day DR Congo was known as the "Republic of Congo." In 1971,
Mobutu changed the name to Zaire. See KEVIN C. DUNN, IMAGINING THE CONGO: THE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF IDENTITY 110 (2003).
62. See Congo Civil War, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/war/congo.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Congo Civil
War].
63. Id.
64. See TURNER, supra note 55, at 150.
65. See NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 10, at 228.
66. See Congo Civil War, supra note 62.
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Rwanda felt it needed to deal with ongoing Interahamwe and RAF
attacks launched from DR Congo 67 and Uganda was honoring its
alliance with Rwanda and also believed that the AFDL still posed
a serious threat as it was using DR Congo as a base.6" So Kabila's
relationship with the Rwandans and Ugandans, as well as their
backers from the United States, deteriorated.6 9
C. The Second Civil War: 1998-2003
War broke out again in 1998.70 This time, Kabila allied him-
self with Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia-and to a certain ex-
tent with Chad, Libya, and Sudan. 7  Facing them were Rwanda
and Uganda-along with Burundi, to a certain extent-and the
rebel groups these countries supported. 72 The Rwandan-backed
rebel group known as the Rassemblement Congolais pour la D6mocra-
tie ("RCD"), immediately went on the offensive. 7' After its initial
advance on Kinshasa was turned back, it retreated to the eastern
portion of the country, where it instituted effective control over
expanses of that region and continued to fight the DR Congo
Army and its foreign allies.7 1 In February 1999, Uganda sup-
ported the establishment of an armed faction called the Mouve-
ment pour la Liberation du Congo ("MLC"), led by Jean-Pierre
67. See Richard W. Bogosian, Aftica at the Crossroads: Current Themes in African Law:
Current Legal Issues in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: Introduction, 10 U. MIAMI1 INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 37, 39 (2001); see also Timeline: Rwanda, BBC NEWS, June 25, 2008, http:/
/news.bbc.co.uk/ 1 /hi/world/africa/ 1070329.stm ("1998 - Rwanda switches allegiance
to support rebel forces trying to depose Kabila in the wake of the Congolese president's
failure to expel extremist Hutu militias.").
68. See John F. Clark, Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo: Evidence and Inter-
pretations, 39 J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 261, 271 (2001). Certain commentators believe
Rwanda and Uganda were motivated only by Congolese resource exploitation concerns
and the reasons cited were mere pretext. See, e.g., NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 10, at
227.
69. See NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 10, at 227.
70. See TURNER, supra note 55, at 40.
71. See Phillip Apuuli Kasaija, Africa at the Crossroads: Current Themes in African Law:
Current Legal Issues in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: International Law and Uganda's
Involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 10 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 75,
77 (2001); Corey Flinoff, Shades of Congo's Troubled Past Appear, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, Nov.
26, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=16614235.
72. See INT'L CRIsis GROUP, How KABILA LosT His WAY: THE PERFORMANCE OF LAU-
RENT DCSIRI KABILA's GOVERNMENT 2 (1999), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/
library/documents/report-archive/A400036_21051999.pdf.
73. See TURNER, supra note 55, at 92-95.
74. See generally BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 59.
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Bemba.75 Uganda and the MLC then exerted control over the
northern third of the country.
76
Eventually, DR Congo was partitioned into three more or
less separate zones with the RCD/Rwanda largely controlling the
country's eastern sector, the MLC/Uganda occupying its north-
ern third, and Congolese forces and their foreign allies asserting
dominion over the balance.77 A stalemate ensued.78
1. The Lusaka Accord
In July 1999, in Lusaka, Zambia, all six main belligerents
(Angola, DR Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe)
agreed to a cease-fire that was signed by the end of August.79 In
addition to the cease-fire, the Lusaka Accord called for: (1) de-
ploying a U.N. peacekeeping operation ("MONUC")8 °; (2) with-
drawing foreign troops; (3) establishing a Joint Verification
Commission (financed by the United States and designed to
track compliance with the Accord); and (4) launching an "Inter-
Congolese Dialogue" with the objective of forming a transitional
government leading to elections. 81 The Lusaka Accord signato-
ries "failed to fully to implement its provisions in 1999 and
2000. "182 In the meantime, the international community became
increasingly critical of Laurent Kabila's efforts to thwart full de-
ployment of MONUC troops, block attempts to engage in a
meaningful Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and stifle any burgeoning
political movements within the country.83
2. Illicit Resource Exploitation
In June 2000, in response to reports of widespread illicit re-
source exploitation, U.N. Security Council President Jean-David
Levitte asked U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Anan to establish a
75. See id.; see also NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 10, at 231.
76. See generally BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 59.
77. See id., Congo Civil War, supra note 62; see also Democratic Republic of Congo: Key
to the Crisis in the Great Lakes Region: Heating Before the H. Subcomm. on Aft. of the H. Comm.
on Int'l Relations, 108th Cong. 72 (2003) (statement of Francois Grignon, Cent. Mr.
Project Dir., Int'l Crisis Group).
78. See Congo Civil War, supra note 62.
79. Id.
80. See Kagan, supra note 34 and accompanying text.
81. Frazer, supra note 27, at 2; Kagan, supra note 34, at 2.
82. Congo Civil War, supra note 62.
83. Id.
2009] 1373
1374 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:1361
"Panel of Experts" on the illegal exploitation of DR Congo's nat-
ural resources and other forms of wealth.84 He also requested
the Panel to research and analyze the links between the resource
exploitation and the continuation of the conflict in DR Congo.
5
Although DR Congo's abundant resources include commodities
such as petroleum and timber, much of the exploitation in-
volved the country's vast mineral wealth, which includes gold,
copper, cobalt, uranium, diamonds, coltan, and cassiterite.86 Ul-
timately, the Panel systematically documented the ways in which
massive exploitation of natural resources was linked to the mili-
tary conflict, arms trafficking, and human rights abuses in the
country.
87
3. Laurent Kabila's Assassination and the Sun City Accord
In the meantime, the conflict dragged on. Then, in January
2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated by one of his own body-
guards."8 His son Joseph became DR Congo's president and the
fighting continued.89 By 2002, however, with U.S. prodding, the
Inter-Congolese Dialogue had commenced in earnest in South
Africa.9" This gave rise to an all-inclusive power-sharing agree-
ment-including a Third-Party Verification Mechanism, once
again financed by the United States' which was signed by dele-
gates in Pretoria on December 17, 2002.92 By this point, all
Angolan, Namibian, Rwandan, and Zimbabwean troops had
withdrawn from DR Congo." The Pretoria Accord was formally
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 59; Dustin Blitchok, Congolese Children Work,
Fight and Die for Our Cell Phones and Diamonds, S.F. BAY VIEW, Oct. 24, 2008, http://
www.sfbayview.com/2008/congolese-children-work-fight-and-die-for-our-cell-phones-
and-diamonds/. Coltan and cassiterite are used to manufacture, among other elec-
tronic appliances, cell phones. See GLOBAL WITNESS, UNDERMINING PEACE: THE EXPLO-
SIVE TRADE IN CASSITERITE IN EASTERN DRC 13-14 (2005), available at http://www.global
witness.org/media-library-get.php/238/1234512380/Under-Mining%2OPeace.pdf.
87. See TURNER, supra note 55, at 163.
88. See id. at 7.
89. See One Year On: Kabila Assassination, BBC NEWS, Jan. 16, 2002, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1763444.stm.
90. See DR Congo: Rwanda-Backed Rebels Continue Seeking Diplomatic Support for Peace,
BBC WORLDWIDE MONTORING-AFRIcA, May 31, 2002 (available on Lexis-Nexis); Congo
Civil War, supra note 62.
91. See Frazer, supra note 27, at 2.
92. See Congo Civil War, supra note 62.
93. See id. Ugandan troops officially Withdrew from DR Congo in May 2003. Id.
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ratified by all parties on April 2, 2003 in Sun City, South Africa
(it is thus also known as the "Sun City Accord")." The United
States played an important role in the diplomacy that
culminated in this agreement.
The agreement provided the framework for DR Congo's
transition to democracy,95 including establishment of a much
criticized Truth and Reconciliation Commission that failed to
provide for adequate representation of the belligerent parties
and the most prominent victim group-women and girls.96 Dur-
ing this time, the United States also took the lead in the U.N.
Security Council and became one of the largest financial con-
tributors to MONUC (which continues today).7
4. The Transitional Period
On June 30, 2003, after each of the signatory groups desig-
nated candidates, President Joseph Kabila formally announced
the transitional government lineup, which would consist of a
president and four vice presidents (forming a so-called "pentar-
chy")."9 Representing various groups involved in the conflict,
the four vice presidents-Azarias Ruberwa, Arthur Z'ahidi
Ngoma, Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, and Jean-Pierre Bemba-
took the oath of office on July 17, 2003."9 Most of the incoming
cabinet members assumed their new functions within days there-
after.1 00
D. Human Rights Violations Continue: 2003 to Present
DR Congo endured a difficult period between the forma-
tion of the transitional government in 2003 and the scheduled
elections ultimately held in 2006. Although armed conflict had
supposedly come to an end, from 2003 through 2005 gross
human rights violations continued to be perpetrated in eastern
Congo.' 0 '
94. Id.
95. See Frazer, supra note 27, at 3.
96. See INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO: ICTJ AcrTvrY (2008), http://www.ictj.org/en/where/regionl/646.html (last
visited Apr. 19, 2009) [hereinafter ICTJ AcriviTv].
97. See Frazer, supra note 27, at 3.
98. See BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 59.
99. See id.
100. See id. Thirty-five cabinet positions were created. Id.
101. See Congo Civil 'War, supra note 62.
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1. The Interahamwe
The remaining Interahamwe feared returning to Rwanda,
convinced they would be targeted by vengeful Tutsi. ° 2 These
Hutu extremists "remained in the forests of east Congo, preying
on villages for food and money. ' 10 3 In May 2005, for example, it
was reported that Interahamwe based in eastern Congo were re-
sponsible for hundreds of summary executions, rapes, beatings
and civilian hostage-taking in the territory of Walungu, South
Kivu Province. 0 4 In the meantime, Rwandan incursions into DR
Congo, designed to clear out these militia forces, "disrupted the
fragile government and [led to further] instability.' 0 5
2. Laurent Nkunda
In addition, one of the groups that had been fighting in the
war, the Rwandan-backed Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma
("RCD-Goma"), was committing war crimes and crimes against
humanity in eastern DR Congo's Kivu region. 0 6 RCD-Goma
soldiers, commanded by Laurent Nkunda, refused to integrate
into the Congolese army and clashed with other Congolese army
forces in South Kivu.1°7 Nkunda and his troops took control of
the South Kivu town of Bukavu on June 2, 2004, claiming this
action was necessary to stop genocide of the Banyamulenge.10 8
During the fighting, Nkunda's troops, alleged by some to be tak-
ing orders from Rwanda,"°9 reportedly carried out war crimes,
killing and raping civilians and looting their property.1 0
Nkunda, whose Tutsi rebel faction renamed itself the National
Congress for the Defense of the People ("CNDP"), was indicted
for war crimes by the Congolese government in September
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See Amnesty Int'l, Democratic Republic of Congo: North-Kivu: Civilians Pay the
Price for Political and Military Rivalry, Al Index AFR 62/013/2005, Sept. 26, 2005, availa-
ble at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR62/O13/2005/en/domAFR6201
32005en.html.
105. See Congo Civil War, supra note 62.
106. See Declan Walsh, While His Soldiers Rape and Pillage, the Rebel General Insists:
'We Come in Peace', INDEP. (London), June 5, 2004, at 35.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See, e.g., id.; Jacques Kahorha, Nkunda Responds to Possible ICC Indictment, INST.
FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, Feb. 9, 2008, http://www.iwpr.net/?s=f&o=342745&
p=acr&l=EN&apc-state=hena_3_kahorha publish date10scompact.
110. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 106.
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2005.111
3. Ethnic Massacres in Ituri Province
Also during this 2003-2005 period, rival militias backed by
Rwanda (supporting the Union of Congolese Patriots ("UPC"))
and Uganda (sponsoring the Nationalist and Integrationist
Front ("FNI")) created instability in the northeastern region of
Ituri, as they battled over border trade and mining of mineral
resources.1 12 At the same time, Ituri also experienced mass eth-
nic violence between the region's agriculturalist Lendu and its
pastoralist Hema ethnic groups.113  The Lendu ethnicity was
largely represented by the FNI militia, while the UPC militia
claimed to be fighting for the Hema. 4 The violence between
these groups was intensified by a "borrowing" of ethnic ideology
from the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda. Lendu began thinking
of themselves as kin to the Hutu, while the Hema identified
themselves with the Tutsi." 5 Five militia leaders who were oper-
ating actively in Ituri during this period, including Nkunda asso-
ciate Bosco Ntaganda," 6 former UPC leader Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, and former DR Congo Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba,
have been indicted by the ICC for war crimes.' 17
111. See Hum. Rts. Watch, D.R. Congo: Arrest Laurent Nkunda for War Crimes, Feb. 1,
2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/O1/31/congo25 7 9_txt.htm.
112. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, CURSE OF GOLD: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 20-
53 (2005) [hereinafter CURSE OF GOLD]; see also INT'L CRISIS GROUP, CONGO CRISIS: MILI-
TARY INTERVENTION IN ITURI 14-15 (2003), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/
home/index.cfm?id=1626.
113. See CURSE OF GOLD, supra note 112, at 20-53; see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, COV-
ERED IN BLOOD 15-16 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/07/
07/covered-blood.
114. See CURSE OF GOLD, supra note 112, at 1.
115. See Press Release, Hum. Rts. Watch, Background to the Hema-Lendu Conflict
in Uganda-Controlled Congo (Jan. 2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/
backgrounder/africa/hemabckg.htm.
116. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
117. See Conflict History: DR Congo, INT'L CRISIS GROUP, July 2008, http://www.crisis
group.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict-search&l=1&t=I&c-country=37 (last vis-
ited Apr. 19, 2009). Lubanga's trial began on January 26, 2009. See Laurie Goering,
Congo Militia Leader's Trial Starts at the Hague; Thomas Lubanga's Child-Soldier Case is the
International Criminal Courts First, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at A4. For a discussion
regarding the International Criminal Court's ("ICC") indictment against Bosco Nta-
ganda, see infra note 132 and accompanying text. For details regarding Bemba's arrest,
see Jean-Pierre Bemba, Former Congo Warlord, Arrested in Belgium, INT'L HERALD TRIB ON-
LINE., May 25, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/05/25/europe/EU-GEN-
13772009]
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4. The Tripartite Process
In 2004, to stem the tide of regional violence and instability
during this period, the United States helped launch the so-called
"tripartite process," resulting in the creation of the "Tripartite
Plus Joint Commission," consisting of Burundi, DR Congo,
Rwanda, and Uganda. 18 The Commission was formed to help
these countries work together cooperatively to resolve their
problems and to support and enhance regional security." 9
5. Elections
After suffering through this difficult period, general elec-
tions were held in DR Congo on July 30, 2006, the first mul-
tiparty elections in the country in forty-six years. 120 Congolese
citizens went to the polls to elect both a new president and Na-
tional Assembly, the lower-house of the Parliament.1 21 A run-off
contest was then held on October 29, 2006 and Joseph Kabila
was elected as DR Congo president. 22 The United States pro-
vided the initial support to launch the Congolese Independent
Election Commission and it sent observers to both rounds of na-
tional elections.123
II. CONGO IN THE AFTERMATH OF ELECTIONS AND U.S.
POLICY DURING THIS TIME
A. Post-Election Human Rights Violations
Although the official end of the war and elections brought a
certain degree of peace to DR Congo, in many respects the war
never ended. 124 The post-2003 armed conflict and large-scale
human rights abuses already described were symptomatic of the
kind of violence that continued to rage throughout the country,
War-Crimes-Bemba.php. Notably, Bemba's current indictment alleges Movement for
the Liberation of Congo crimes committed in the Central African Republic. See id.
118. See Frazer, supra note 27, at 2.
119. See id.
120. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Congo Votes in Its First Multiparty Election in 46 Years,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2008, at A3.
121. See id.
122. See Eddy Isango, Kabila Promises New Era for Congo; Nation Inaugurates First
Freely Elected Leader Since 1960, WASH. PosT, Dec. 7, 2006, at A23.
123. See Frazer, supra note 27, at 2, 5.
124. See generally Conflict History: DR Congo, supra note 117.
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especially in its eastern region. 12  Numerous militias, such as
Nkunda's CNDP, various Mai Mai fighting groups (such as the
Congolese Patriotic Resistance), and former Interahamwe (trans-
forming themselves into the AFDL and its splinter groups) never
put down their arms.126
Early in 2007, combatants loyal to Nkunda were integrated
into the national army in a process called "mixage."127 Unfortu-
nately, the newly established "mixed" brigades killed scores of
civilians and committed rapes and other abuses in their opera-
tions against the AFDL.128 By August 2007, the political agree-
ments had collapsed and many of Nkunda's former troops re-
turned to his control. Renewed clashes between Nkunda's
troops and government soldiers followed.1
2 9
In the latter part of 2008, after a brief respite, Nkunda
launched a new offensive against government forces that re-
sulted in the eventual encirclement of Goma.13 The fighting
forced more than a quarter of a million people from their
homes.1 3 1
In early January 2009, Nkunda was ousted from the CNDP
by his Chief-of-Staff, General Bosco Ntaganda.'1 2 Nkunda was
captured by Rwandan forces a couple of weeks later.1 31 It is not
clear whether Rwanda "will be willing to hand him over to their
former rivals [DR Congo] and risk damaging revelations about
their past relationship. 13 a
Despite efforts at a cease-fire and the capture of Nkunda in
125. See generally id.
126. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, CONGO: BRINGING PEACE TO NORTH Kivu 1, 8, 17
(2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5134.
127. Id. at 30.
128. Id. at 11.
129. Id. at 13.
130. SeeJeffrey Gettleman, In Congo, a Little Fighting Brings a Lot of Fear, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2008, at A6.
131. See Peter Greste, Nkunda's Spectacular Fall, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2009, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7846940.stm.
132. See id. General Ntaganda was recently indicted by the ICC. See Michael
Deibert, DR Congo: Rebel Leader Indictment Made Public, HUM. RTS. TRIB., May 2, 2008,
http://www.humanrights-geneva.info/spip.php?page=pint-article&idarticle=3065. In
its indictment, the ICC alleges that, prior to his joining the National Congress for the
Defense of the People, Ntaganda "committed war crimes of enlistment and conscrip-
tion of children under the age of 15" and used the children "to participate actively in
hostilities in Ituri .. .from July 2002 until December 2003." Id.
133. See Greste, supra note 131.
134. Id.
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the first part of 2009, fighting has not ceased. 135 In fact, the
specter of mass violence continues to loom over the battle-
scarred east Congolese landscape:
[Nkunda's capture] doesn't mean the war is over. In fact UN
diplomats have warned that it could even deteriorate in the
short term. The newjoint Congolese-Rwandan force is yet to
take on the Hutu militias every bit as ruthless as the Lord's
Resistance Army which has killed at least 600 civilians in repri-
sals for a similar multi-national offensive further to the north.
And eastern Congo is-still-a bewildering patchwork of war-
lords who will scramble to fill the vacuum. Gen Nkunda's ar-
rest takes one element out of the problem, but it by no means
solves it.1 3 6
And as just indicated, the region has been plagued by fresh
atrocities from a new force: Uganda's rebel group the Lord's
Resistance Army ("LRA").' 3 7 The LRA have been fighting gov-
ernment forces in Uganda and committing atrocities against ci-
vilians there for decades.'13  Its top leaders, including chief Jo-
seph Kony, have been indicted by the ICC for crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes.' 39 As the LRA's operating space in
Uganda has increasingly shrunk, it has turned its attention to DR
Congo, where, since late December 2008, it has murdered over
500 people and forced over 100,000 to flee their homes to avoid
attacks while it abducts children to serve as soldiers. 40
Issues lying below the surface, including questions about mi-
litia disarmament, army reform, justice for atrocity victims, and
the illegal exploitation of mineral wealth have not been effec-
tively resolved and continue to wreak havoc. 141 In many re-
spects, mineral exploitation and its attendant problems have
been most responsible for fueling the ongoing violence.' 4 2 So
has weapons smuggling. Despite arms embargos imposed on the
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See LRA Rebels Commit New Atrocities, BBC NEWS, Jan. 16, 2009, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7834242.stm.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Hum. Rts. Watch, Democratic Republic of Congo Q &A, Apr. 25, 2008, http://
www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/04/25/q-democratic-republic-congo [hereinafter Q &
A].
142. Id.; see Ezekiel, supra note 7, at 227.
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country by U.N. Security Council resolutions in 2003, 2005,
2006, 2007, and 2008,' weapons are freely smuggled into its
borders and circulated internally.144 And embargoed material is
stockpiled.14 5 These weapons are further promoting the vio-
lence. 14 6
As a result, over a million Congolese people in North and
South Kivu provinces are still displaced and remain too fright-
ened to go home. 4 7 The situation for women and girls has been
especially dire. At least 60,000 Congolese females along the en-
tire age spectrum have been raped by militia groups or soldiers
from the DR Congo army.'48 Sadly, little girls have in no way
been spared. Four-thousand of the rape victims in one province,
for example, consisted of children. Armed groups also continue
to press children into military service. 1 4 9 Consequently, DR
Congo has among the highest numbers of child soldiers in the
world.1 50
B. The Nairobi-Goma Peace Process
In November 2007, the United States helped facilitate an
accord between DR Congo and Rwanda (known as the "Nairobi
CommuniquC') that is designed to tackle problems related to
the presence of the AFDL in the Kivus.15 1
On January 23, 2008, after weeks of negotiation, a ceasefire
agreement ("Goma Agreement") was signed by DR Congo gov-
ernment officials and twenty-two armed groups in the eastern
town of Goma. 152 As before, United States participation was crit-
ical to the successful outcome. 15 The Goma Agreement put in
143. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Extends Arms Embargo
on Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N. Doc. SC/9248 (Feb. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9248.doc.htm (referencing U.N. Secur-
ity Council Resolutions 1493 (2003), 1596 (2005), 1698 (2006), 1771 (2007), and 1799
(2008)).
144. See Elizabeth Powers, Greed, Guns and Grist: U.S. Military Assistance and Arms
Transfers to Developing Countries, 84 N.D. L. REv. 383, 404 (2008).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Q &A, supra note 141.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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place the "Amani Program," an eastern Congo peace transition
initiative headed by Abb6 Apollinaire Malu Malu, a Catholic
priest.154
The Agreement also established a Joint Technical Commit-
tee on Peace and Security ("Goma Committee"), a monitoring
body that will help iron out certain details related to troop disen-
gagement. 55 The Committee, which held its first official meet-
ing on April 3, 2008, has fielded representatives from all the
armed factions in the conflict. "6 It is jointly chaired by the Con-
golese government and representatives of the international com-
munity, including the United States. 57
In addition, International and Congolese non-governmen-
tal organizations seek to create an independent special advisor
for human rights. This office could play an essential role in as-
sisting the Committee as it tackles the thorny human rights is-
sues that will inevitably arise during implementation of the
Goma Agreement. 158
C. Humanitarian Assistance Efforts
1. The DR Congo Relief, Security and Democracy Promotion
Act
Recent U.S. efforts to establish peace in DR Congo have also
involved assistance in alleviating suffering and fortifying the
country's civil institutions. On December 22, 2006, Congress en-
acted the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security and
Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 ("DR Congo Act").' 59 The
DR Congo Act established fifteen policy objectives aimed at ad-
dressing a range of concerns regarding humanitarian assistance,
social development, economic and natural resource exploita-
tion, governance and security issues.'6 ° Without coordinating
between and among each other, in fiscal years 2006 and 2007,
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Pub. L. No. 109-456, 120 Stat. 3384 (2006); see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-08-662T, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: MAJOR CHALLENGES
IMPEDE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES; SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF PRO-
GRESS Is NEEDED 1 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08562t.pdf
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
160. See GAO REPORT, supra note 159, at 1.
AN AFRICAN MARSHALL PLAN
respectively, U.S. agencies-the U.S. Agency for International
Development ("USAID") as well as the U.S. Departments of Agri-
culture, Defense, Health and Human Services, Labor, State, and
Treasury-collectively allocated a total of about US$217.9 million
and US$181.5 million for the Congolese under the DR Congo
Act.
1 6 1
About seventy percent of these funds were allocated for pro-
grams that support the Act's humanitarian and social develop-
ment objectives, while the remainder was targeted for programs
and activities that support the Act's economic, governance, and
security objectives. 162 For example, USAID is making available
humanitarian assistance that includes emergency supplies, food,
water, and sanitation improvements to vulnerable popula-
tions. 163 The Department of Treasury has worked to furnish the
country with interim debt relief.164 And the Department of State
has been tasked with providing training and other assistance
aimed at professionalizing members of DR Congo's military. 65
2. December 2008 Assistance Funds
On December 18, 2008, the United States approved the re-
lease of an additional US$6 million in aid for refugees and peo-
ple displaced by the violence in eastern DR Congo. 166 These
funds are to be used to provide emergency relief commodities,
and address humanitarian protection needs. 167 This includes
donating simple commodities such as blankets, water buckets,
mosquito nets, and kitchen sets; registering and relocating peo-
ple who have been displaced; and addressing the needs of wo-
men and children who have been victims of sexual violence.168
Nevertheless, despite these efforts to comfort victims and es-
tablish civil society in DR Congo, and apart from the violence
directly caused by Nkunda's latest offensive, the U.N. and others
have reported that over the last year scores of Congolese civilians
161. Id. at 2.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Bush Releases 6 Million in Refugee Aid for DR Congo, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec.
19, 2008, available at http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsId=19667.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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have been deliberately killed, executed, or "disappeared," some
of them children.169 Officials report that at least 500 women and
girls were raped. This figure is in all likelihood much higher as
the reported number only reflects those who reached a clinic for
medical treatment.17 ° By way of example, each month since Jan-
uary 2008 at least fifty women and girls have been reported
raped in the town of Shabunda (South Kivu province).1'
Clearly, the violence associated with the overall armed conflict
and the absence of valid, functioning social institutions has per-
sisted. 72 And still this does not include the recent brutalities
inflicted by the Lord's Resistance Army, which U.S. policy has
not even had a chance to address.
III. RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY TO PROMOTE
THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
DR Congo appears to have reached a critical juncture in its
tumultuous history. After years of suffering under dictatorship
and a series of devastating internal and regional armed conflicts,
it has installed its first democratically elected government in
more than forty years.1 73 And while the United States bears sig-
nificant responsibility for many of DR Congo's past problems,
the United States has partially atoned for its sins by playing an
important role in the fall of the Mobutu regime and helping to
negotiate the end of the post-Mobutu wars, promote regional se-
curity, facilitate elections, provide humanitarian assistance, and
nurture DR Congo's fledgling democracy. But these efforts have
not achieved the desired goal of ending DR Congo's internal
armed conflicts and atrocities and establishing a stable society.1 7 4
But what more can the United States do to promote peace
and prosperity in DR Congo? The answer lies in both procedu-
ral and substantive changes to U.S. policy. This should lead to a
massive infusion of assistance that can be thought of as an "Afri-
can Marshall Plan."
169. Q & A, supra note 141.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Editor's Note, Congo (Kinshasa): Still No Peace in the East, AFRicAFocus
BULL., May 2, 2008, http://www.afiicafocus.org/docs08/conk0805.php.
173. See GAO REPORT, supra note 159, at 1.
174. See id.
AN AFRICAN MARSHALL PLAN
A. Procedural Policy Reforms
Procedurally, the United States needs to formulate a more
coherent and unified policy regarding DR Congo. Part of this
will entail coordinating its various and scattered agency activities.
There has been some recent progress in this regard as the Na-
tional Security Council has established an interagency group, in-
cluding the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury, to
help discuss DR Congo policies and approaches and coordinate
certain agency activities.175 However, this group does not in-
clude other agencies that contribute to U.S. assistance efforts
(such as the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human
Services, or Labor) or other agencies that could make important
contributions (such as the Department of Justice).176
Moreover, since the U.S. government has not established a
process to assess systematically its overall progress in DR Congo,
it cannot accurately determine whether it has distributed its re-
sources in the most effective manner. Nor, for that matter, can
it determine whether it is earmarking sufficient resources for the
Congolese. In this regard, benchmarks are essential to evaluate
progress with respect to the Congolese human rights situa-
tion.' 77 Formulation of such reference points, thus, must be an
integral part of U.S. procedural policy reform.
In addition to promoting internal coherence and efficiency,
the proposed coordination process could help the United States
identify additional bilateral or multilateral measures that would
contribute to success in its DR Congo policy. What partners
would be most effective in working with the United States in ef-
fecting holistic change that will lead to the end of atrocities in
DR Congo? Should the United States focus on spearheading ini-
tiatives with the EU, the African Union, the U.N., or all three?
Or can other partners be identified? How can the United States
best coordinate with these partners? Put simply, internal U.S.
coordination will help work out these external issues and pro-
mote superior transnational coordination.
175. See id. at 16.
176. See id.
177. See John McKenzie, The Limits of Offshoring-Why the United States Should Keep
Enforcement of Human Rights Standards "In-House", 83 IND. LJ. 1121, 1122 (2008) (sug-
gesting the value of transforming "lofty aspirations" into actual benchmarks for assess-
ing progress in promotion of human rights).
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Finally, procedural reform in delivery of U.S. assistance to
DR Congo also entails effective monitoring and quality control
of allocation and distribution of aid and assistance. Given the
long-standing and pervasive culture of corruption in DR
Congo, 78 successful aid delivery is currently jeopardized by the
malfeasance of official Congolese recipients. An American
ombudsman or other oversight mechanism should be imple-
mented to prevent this from happening.
Similarly, the United States should have a permanent pres-
ence on the ground to coordinate its participation in all peace
and stabilization efforts. It has already made some progress in
that regard. In September 2007, it appointed senior conflict ad-
visor Tim Shortley to support peace efforts in eastern DR
Congo. 179 It should go further by establishing permanent offices
in the Kivus (where a majority of human rights violations are
currently taking place) and Kinshasa-with full-time staff from
USAID and the Department of State, among others-to sustain
U.S. engagement in curbing human rights abuses and establish-
ing the rule of law throughout the country."' 0
B. Substantive Policy Reforms
Were this procedural reform to be instituted, the United
States could start to address some of the serious substantive is-
sues plaguing its DR Congo policy. To begin with, U.S. strategy
currently emphasizes humanitarian aid at the expense of law sec-
tor reform. However, there is a good argument for shifting the
policy focus to rule of law and security sector reform. In the
absence of legal norms and safety, the country is simply incapa-
ble of developing its civil society and the United States is in any
event hindered in delivering humanitarian assistance. Law and
order must be the first order of business.
But what concrete measures could the United States take to
help institute law and order in this largely anarchic country and
its surrounding region? As mentioned above, there are three ar-
eas in which reform could lead to significant progress: eliminat-
178. See Posting of Megan Rowling to Reuters AlertNet, Corruption in Congo: Seeing
the Wood for the Trees, http://www.alertnet.org/db/blogs/20316/2007/03/12-122132-
1.htm (Apr. 12, 2007, 12:21 GMT).
179. See, e.g., POLICY STANDARD, supra note 29.
180. See, e.g., id. (advocating a permanent office in eastern DR Congo).
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ing the so-called "negative forces" in the region, building up es-
sential institutions in DR Congo, and ending impunity.
1. Eliminating "Negative Forces"
In general, for those who work on DR Congo issues, the
"negative forces" are the militias, rebel groups, and criminal
Congolese government military and security personnel that have
participated in mass murder, large-scale sexual violence
(wherein tens of thousands of Congolese women and girls have
been raped), and numerous other human rights violations. In
the short-term, the United States must direct a large portion of
its investment in DR Congo to eliminating these forces. This can
be achieved through four objectives: providing additional sup-
port for the ongoing (and often ineffective) Disarmament, De-
mobilization & Repatriation ("DDR") program and the military
integration process; seeking Rwandan support for these initia-
tives; preventing the free flow of arms into DR Congo; and
preventing illegal resource exploitation, which has both fueled
and financed the negative forces.
a. Demilitarization & Integration
Demilitarization entails both disarming and demobilizing
combatants and then reintegrating them into society.' It isjus-
tified by the tendency of combatants to upset and jeopardize the
peace process by initiating fresh hostilities with their former op-
ponents or by using their weapons to perpetrate garden variety
crimes. 18 2 And an essential component of demilitarization in-
volves providing monetary incentives to help spur combatant re-
integration into society."' Thus, in DR Congo, combatants have
been given the choice of either entering into civilian life or join-
ing the Forces Arnes de la Rpublique Democratique du Congo
("FARDC") .184
181. See Monika Thakur, Demilitarising Militias in the Kivus (eastern Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo), 17.1 AFR. SECURTy REv. 52, 53 (2008), available at http://www.iss.co.za/
dynamic/administration/file-manager/file_links/ I 7NO1THAKUR.PDF?linkid=4057
&slink id=5819&linktype=12&slink type=13&tmpl_id=3.; see also Ruth Wedgewood,
Harold K. Jacobson & Allan Gerson, Peace Building: The Private Sector's Role, 95 Am. J.
INT'L L. 102, 105-06 (2001) (describing the World Bank's and U.N.'s recent experience
involving post-conflict demilitarization).
182. See Thakur, supra note 181, at 53.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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Owing to the complexities of the Congolese war, the gov-
ernment and international community have had to deal with
both Congolese and foreign armed groups and militias. Con-
golese armed groups have been undergoing the DDR process.'1 5
Foreign armed groups, on the other hand, have been undergo-
ing the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegra-
tion, or resettlement ("DDRRR") process. 1 6
Pursuant to the Nairobi Communiqu6 (also known as the
Nairobi Action Plan) and the Goma Agreement, MONUC
DDRRR teams have redoubled efforts, working jointly with Con-
golese authorities, to educate Rwandan combatants about the
DDRRR process."' This public awareness campaign is designed
to enhance combatant appreciation of the tangible social and
economic opportunities open to those who surrender their
weapons and choose voluntary repatriation to Rwanda.' Al-
though it is the linchpin of efforts to restore order in eastern DR
Congo, it has proceeded at a snail's pace and lacks sufficient per-
sonnel and materiel. 9 Ongoing military clashes between and
among the FARDC, the CNDP, the AFDL, and the Mai Mai
demonstrate that the DDRRR process is far from complete and
that the Congolese government still faces formidable challenges
in disarming and demobilizing these volatile elements in the
Kivus.
The United States, coordinating with other significant do-
nors such as the EU, would do well to make substantial resource
contributions to this effort as foreign combatants play a signifi-
cant role in the current violence and human rights violations in
the east. With the success of the DDRRR process, a secure east-
ern DR Congo will provide the basis for stabilizing the rest of the
country, instituting the rule of law, and ending the large-scale
human rights abuses.
But for stability to take root in eastern DR Congo (and the
rest of the country, for that matter), the DDR process must also
come to fruition. Remaining renegade rank-and-file Congolese
troops, which also commit atrocities in eastern DR Congo and
185. Id. at 54.
186. Id.
187. See Implementation of the Nairobi Action Plan Underway, MONUC, May 28, 2008,
available at http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newslD=17443.
188. Id.
189. See Congo Briefing, supra note 18.
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elsewhere, must be neutralized, brought to justice (where appro-
priate), effectively integrated into the FARDC or returned to ci-
vilian life. It will be crucial then, to assure that stabilization ef-
forts not focus entirely on the Kivus. Brutality still reigns in
other parts of the country, such as Bas-Congo, where Congolese
police have inflicted deadly violence on members of the Bundu
Dia Kongo politico-religious movement since January 2008.90
For those ex-combatants who choose to reintegrate into ci-
vilian life, sufficient social and economic infrastructure to absorb
and sustain them will be the order of the day.'91 This is espe-
cially true for child ex-combatants-they are the future of DR
Congo and they must be properly educated and embraced by
the community.
And those who opt to join the FARDC should expect to
work for a professional, well-structured fighting force that re-
spects international humanitarian and human rights law. Ex-
pending additional resources toward professionalization of the
FARDC is therefore critical. There must be an appreciable in-
crease in U.S. investment for this essential process, which has
also been hindered by shortages of both men and money.'
9 2
190. See Peacekeeping Force in DR Congo Stretched to the Limit-Latest UN Report, U.N.
NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 8, 2008, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?News
ID=26250.
191. See generally Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Contemporary Security and Development Trends
in the Great Lakes Region (Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program,
Working Paper No. 4, Sept. 2008), available at http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/
MDRPWorkingPaper4.pdf.
192. See Off. of Int'lJust. & Peace, U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, Background on the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Feb. 2008, http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/projects/200802dr
congobck.pdf [hereinafter DRC Background]; see also Letter from Howard J. Hubbard,
Bishop of Albany, to Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec'y of State (Nov. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/callafrica/Hubbard Letter-C_Rice-i 1-25-
08.pdf. Any such assistance, however, must be in accord with the so-called "Leahy Law."
The "Leahy Law" consists of a human rights rider to recent appropriations legislation
that is meant to curb assistance to foreign military units that have "committed gross
violations of human rights." See Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
106-429 § 563, 114 Stat.1900, 1900A-46 (2001). The law is known by the name of its
principal sponsor, Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy. Originally part of the 1997 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), and only
pertaining to the State Department's International Narcotics Control program, it sub-
stantially expanded its scope in the 2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, Pub
L. No. 106-429 § 563, 114 Stat. 1900, 1900A-46 (2000). That portion of the law reads:
None of the funds made available by this Act may be provided to any unit of
the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible
evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless
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b. Rwanda
Demobilization of the Hutu combatants clearly requires the
support and participation of Rwanda,193 a participant/signatory
in the Nairobi and Goma processes. Nevertheless, until recently,
Rwanda was still being accused of providing covert assistance to
Nkunda'94 and generally failing to take seriously its Nairobi
Communiqu6 obligations.'95 Although its nascent cooperation
with DR Congo led to Nkunda's recent arrest, it is not clear
whether Rwanda intends to hand over the renegade general to
face justice in Kinshasa.' 96 For the effective functioning of the
Goma/Nairobi processes in general, and the DDRRR process in
particular, greater cooperation from Rwanda remains indispen-
sable.
Moreover, the rebel Hutus must have legitimate incentives
to return to Rwanda. This will require that Rwanda ensure re-
turning Hutus are treated fairly and given social and economic
opportunities (although gnocidaires have to be brought to jus-
tice).197 To the extent Rwanda requires continuing or expanded
financial support for these efforts, it should be furnished by the
the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations
that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the
responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.
Id. The Foreign Operations statute covers both training and assistance, such as weap-
ons grants. In contrast, the "Leahy Law," embedded in the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-259 § 8052, 114 Stat. 656, 687 (2001), pertains
uniquely to training and states, in relevant part:
None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to support any
training program involving a unit of the security forces of a foreign country if
the Secretary of Defense has received credible information from the Depart-
ment of State that a member of such unit has committed a gross violation of
human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.
Id. The "Leahy Law" is often lauded as the most effective legal means to ensure human
rights compliance in connection with U.S. security assistance programs. See Bill Quigley,
The Case for Closing the School of the Americas, 20 BYUJ. PuB. L. 1, 8 n.39 (2005).
193. See Stephanie McCrummen, Coaxing Militiamen Out of Congo, WASH. POST,
Dec. 3, 2008, at Al.
194. See Twende Twende, Will Peace Talks Be Enough to End Years of Conflict?,
http://twendetwende.wordpress.com/2008/01/07/will-peace-talks-be-enough-to-end-
years-of-conflict/ (Jan. 7, 2008).
195. See Congo Briefing, supra note 18.
196. See DR Congo Seeks Nkunda Extradition, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2009, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7847639.stm; Jeffrey Gettleman, An Interview with Joseph
Kabila, N.Y. T IMs ONLINE, Apr. 3, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
04/04/world/africa/04kabilatranscript.htmi.
197. See generally Khadiagala, supra note 191.
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United States. Additionally, given its long-standing alliance with
and support of Rwanda, the United States is in a unique position
to influence Rwanda's domestic and foreign policy to conform
with all U.S. regional peace and stability initiatives, as reflected
in the Goma/Nairobi processes.
c. Working to Stop Arms Transfers and Smuggling
The international community must also improve the over-
sight and enforcement of the free flow of arms in DR Congo and
throughout the Great Lakes region. The U.N. General Assembly
passed a resolution regarding a comprehensive arms trade treaty
in December 2006.19' Unfortunately, the United States voted
against this resolution.199 More recently, in a call for country
views on an arms trade treaty, ninety-four countries submitted
their views before the June 20, 2007 deadline.2 0 0 Once again,
the United States abdicated responsibility by failing to submit its
view. 20 1 Given U.S. domination of the global arms transfer in-
dustry, 2 2 such a laissez-faire approach undermines larger Ameri-
can peace objectives for the Congolese. In fact, the United
States should be the catalyst for regional reform by developing
and supporting relevant legal initiatives and by providing fund-
ing and manpower to control arms transfers and smuggling in
DR Congo and neighboring countries.
d. Preventing Illegal Resource Exploitation
Much of DR Congo's armed conflict has been fueled and
financed by illicit trade in minerals and other natural re-
sources.20 3 Currently, much of that activity is taking place in
North and South Kivu, where militias operate with the incentive
198. First Committee Res. 394, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/61/L.55 (Oct. 12, 2006), adopted
by G.A. Res. 89, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/89 (Dec. 6, 2006).
199. UN Assembly Adopts A77 Resolution, INT'L ACTION NETWORK ON SMALL ARMS,
Dec. 2006, http://www.iansa.org/un/2006/GAvote.htm.
200. More Success for the Arms Trade Treaty Campaign, INT'L ACTION NETWORK ON
SMALL ARMS, June 29, 2007, http://www.iansa.org/campaignsevents/more-att
success.htm.
201. Id.
202. Arms Trade Key Statistics, BBC NEWS, Sept. 15, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/business/4238644.stm. In the United States alone, arms deliveries by private per-
sons were valued at US$18.5 billion in 2004. Id. The leading competitor, Russia, ac-
counted for a mere US$4.6 billion. Id.
203. See generally Ezekiel, supra note 7.
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of personal enrichment primarily through control of mining ar-
eas and exploitation of their resources (which also pays for the
internecine violence) .2 4 Extracted minerals are being pur-
chased and exploited by U.S. companies to manufacture every-
thing from cell phones to gas turbine airplane engines. 2°5 Amer-
ican companies that take advantage of these illicit, low-priced
commodities should be fined, sanctioned, and possibly prose-
cuted by the U.S. government. This will go a long way toward
reducing the motivation and sustenance of negative forces in DR
Congo. Moreover, the United States should assist the Congolese
government in creating legislative means to ensure that profits
from exploitation of natural resources be equitably distributed
to local communities.20 6
2. Establishing Positive Forces
In addition to backing efforts to eradicate negative forces in
the region, the United States must also make significant contri-
butions toward establishing positive forces in DR Congo. There
are three primary building efforts on which to focus: expanding
and strengthening MONUC, establishing a human rights infra-
structure, and building up civil society.
a. MONUC
Although it runs the world's most expensive peacekeeping
operation,2" 7 MONUC's current force levels do not permit effec-
tive implementation of the Goma/Nairobi peace process. 208
MONUC's resources are being stretched beyond capacity, which
jeopardizes the often fragile or eroding equilibrium established
in high-tension areas such as Bas Congo.20 9 Quite simply, it is
204. See Arms Trade Key Statistics, supra note 202; see, e.g., Martin Plaut, UN Troops in
Congo Gold Warning, BBC NEws, July 6, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
7492485.stm (reporting that Rwandan militia allegedly were involved in gold traffick-
ing).
205. Naomi Cahn & Anthony Gambino, Towards a Typology of Corporate Responsibility
in Different Governance Contexts: What to Do in the Absence of Responsible Country Govern-
ance?, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 655, 669-70 n.63 (2008).
206. See DRC Background, supra note 192.
207. See John Heilprin, UN Chief Defends Peacekeeping Mission in Congo, ASSOCIATED
PR~ss, Feb. 28, 2009, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/20
09/02/28/international/i072035S80.DTL
208. See Peacekeeping Force in DR Congo Stretched to the Limit-Latest UN Report, supra
note 190.
209. Id.
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difficult, if not impossible, for a force of fewer than 20,000 to
provide stability to a country the size of Western Europe.210 Else-
where, far more troops have been deployed in much smaller
countries with similar problems. In Liberia, for example, whose
entire surface area is little more than one average Congolese dis-
trict, roughly 15,000 U.N. peacekeeping troops have been placed
in service. And Burundi, DR Congo's postage-stamp-size neigh-
bor to the east, has received approximately 5000.211 MONUC
quite obviously needs to muster troop numbers compatible with
the enormous size of DR Congo and capable of handling the
commensurately large security challenges it faces.2 1 2
In addition to providing extra cash for MONUC, the United
States should actually contribute troops. Well trained, well disci-
plined American military personnel could make a significant dif-
ference in empowering MONUC to fulfill its Herculean task.2 13
Much like the Marshall Plan, perhaps it is time to start thinking
of MONUC as the beginning of a new kind of North Atlantic
Treaty Organization in Africa.
Part of this should entail the United States ensuring that all
MONUC personnel are properly trained and that any found en-
gaging in violations of human rights or humanitarian laws be
swiftly and appropriately punished. U.S. financing and partici-
pation should be contingent on imposition of such conditions.
Finally, resources should be consecrated to instituting effec-
tive outreach programs for MONUC to promote a positive image
among Congolese civilians and those in arms. This is critical in
210. See Congo-Kinshasa: New Military Centre Built by UN Blue Helmets Unveiled, U.N.
NEWs SERVICE, Dec. 31, 2007, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200712310832.
html (indicating that as of the beginning of 2008 MONUC had 18,407 total uniformed
personnel).
211. MONUC: A Casefor Peacekeeping Reform, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Mar. 1, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/01/congol0222.htm.
212. Id.
213. After the U.N.'s abject 1990s failure to stop massive internecine violence in
Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, conventional wisdom questioned the
U.N.'s capacity to engage in effective peacekeeping operations. Others stepped in. In
1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, not U.N. forces, stopped the killing of
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Later that year a force led by Australia halted the conflict
in East Timor. Soon thereafter, the quick deployment of British soldiers in Sierra Le-
one helped save what was then the U.N.'s largest peacekeeping mission from collapse
after attacks by Revolutionary United Front rebel forces. See Call the Blue Helmets, ECONO-
MIST ONLINE, Jan. 4, 2007, http://www.economist.com/research/backgrounders/
displaystory.cfm?story-id=8490163.
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light of, inter alia, the crimes (including sexual violence) alleg-
edly committed by MONUC personnel 1 4 and discontent with
MONUC, as demonstrated by recent riots in eastern DR
Congo.215 A public outreach campaign will go a long way toward
ameliorating public perception of MONUC and thereby make it
a much more effective force.
b. Security Sector Reform
In addition to DDR, DDRRR, and integration, DR Congo
needs a global approach to security sector reform that includes
more than the army.216 Of course, national and local police
forces must also be given adequate training and resources.2 1 7 In
addition, the intelligence sector, border control, and customs
should also be studied and upgraded to achieve internal efficacy
and meaningful integration with the military and police
forces. 18
c. National Human Rights Office
As mentioned previously, international and Congolese
human rights and aid groups hope that an independent special
advisor for human rights can be established to assist the Goma
Committee deal with DR Congo's ongoing human rights is-
sues. 219 This is an excellent idea but should be extended to the
national level. Given human rights violations occurring
throughout the country, including in diverse places such as Bas
Congo, Kinshasa, and the Ituris, a Congolese national human
rights ombudsman should be created. This office should have
regional branches in various provinces and the resources and ca-
pacity, inter alia, to bring litigation and undertake educational
programs.
214. See MONUC: A Case for Peacekeeping Reform, supra note 211.
215. See DR Congo: Aid Activities Suspended after Riots in North Kivu, INTEGRATED
REG'L INFO. NETWORKS, June 25, 2008, available at http://www.irinnews.org/Report.
aspx?Reporld=78936.
216. See generally Roger Kibasomba, Post-War Defence Integration in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo, ISS Paper 119 (Inst. for Security Stud.), Dec. 2005, available at http:/
/www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file manager/file-links/I 19.PDF?Iinkid=31
&slinkid=3612&linktype=12&slink-type=23&tmplid=3.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Q &A, supra note 141.
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d. Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Experts have noted that "to restore the social fabric of the
[DR Congo], some form of truth-telling will be necessary."220
The United States should bankroll the establishment and opera-
tion of a new Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC").
As alluded to above, the Sun City TRC, which never heard a sin-
gle case, failed because it did not provide for proper representa-
tion of the belligerent parties and placed the perpetrators' inter-
ests ahead of the victims'. 2 21 In particular, women and girls, who
have borne the brunt of Congolese internecine civilian violence,
should exercise a leadership role in setting up any future TRC
and have a more prominent voice in its proceedings. 222
e. Civil Society: An Emphasis on Judicial Sector Reform
In the absence of genuine efforts to rebuild Congolese civil
society, the measures listed above will be of little to no avail. In
addition to governmental, commercial, and medical infrastruc-
ture and services, civic participation at all levels must be en-
couraged and permitted to flourish.223 Internally displaced per-
sons and refugees must be resettled and given assistance.224 Cor-
ruption must be systematically rooted out.225 Investment in a
long-term development strategy is essential. This will require the
maintenance, improvement, and significant expansion of such
American efforts as the DR Congo Act.226
For purposes of instituting and preserving peace, enforcing
the rule of law is paramount and so the judicial sector stands out
as perhaps the top priority in this area. It must be furnished
with adequate personnel, resources, and training. In this regard,
220. ICTJ AcTIvrTY, supra note 96.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Jose Ayala-Lasso, Making Human Rights a Reality in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 497, 504 (1996) (indicating that "rebuilding civil society
and national capacities," which strengthens democracy and the rule of law, is essential
for the protection of human rights).
224. See Jude Murison, The Politics of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the
Congo War, in AFRICAN STAKES OF THE CONGO WAR 227 (John F. Clark ed., 2002).
225. SeeJames C. Hathaway, Forced Migration Studies: Could We Agree Just to "Date"?,
20 J. REFUGEE STUD. 349, 360 (2007) (according the U.N.'s Assistant High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, "corruption [in DR Congo] is everywhere endemic and ram-
pant.").
226. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 159.
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two sections of the U.S. Department of Justice could provide in-
valuable assistance. The International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance Program ("ICITAP") 227 could send experts
to provide specialized training to various Congolese law enforce-
ment branches.228 Similarly, the Office of Prosecutorial Devel-
opment, Assistance and Training ("OPDAT") could supply a resi-
dent legal advisor to Kinshasa to help with rebuilding the justice
sector. 22' Together, these two agencies could team up to accom-
plish, inter alia, the following: (1) establish community justice
projects that improve coordination between police, prisons, and
courts; (2) institute anti-corruption programs; and (3) set up a
Women's Justice and Empowerment Initiative that seeks to im-
prove the government's ability to investigate, prosecute, and ad-
judicate DR Congo's rampant gender-based crimes.230
3. Ending Impunity
As the preceding paragraphs make clear, there can be no
peace without justice in DR Congo. For the cycles of violence
and war to abate, perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against hu-
manity, and genocide must be held to account for their offenses.
Moreover, human rights and humanitarian law must be strictly
enforced to prevent commission of such crimes in the future.
227. See Bruce Zagaris, Developments in the Institutional Architecture and Framework of
International Criminal and Enforcement Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere, 37 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 421, 430 (2006) (generally describing the International Criminal In-
vestigative Training Assistance Program ("ICITAP")).
228. Id. Zagaris explains that within the "overlapping set of U.S. agencies and indi-
viduals assisting foreign police," ICITAP emerged in the 1990s as the agency with pri-
mary responsibility for coordinating U.S. assistance to foreign police forces. Id. Estab-
lished in 1986 as a United States Department of Justice operation, ICITAP functions
with policy guidance from the Department of State. Id. Channeling State Department
money, USAID takes care of ICITAP's funding. ICITAP's primary objective is to train
foreign police, prosecutors, judges, and other criminal justice personnel to further the
"rule of law" in their respective countries. Id.
229. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and International Criminal
Justice, 105 MICH. L. REv. 985, 1004-05 (2007) (explaining that the Office of
Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training ("OPDAT") was set up to provide
assistance to foreign nations and to provide "the U.S. with a stronger base of foreign
cooperation" in combating organized crime, illegal narcotics, terrorism, and prosecut-
ing war crimes).
230. ICITAP and OPDAT have already partnered to establish similar programs in
other parts of Africa. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Africa and Middle East, http://
www.usdoj.gov/cfiminal/icitap/programs/africa-mideast/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).
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The United States can and should play a crucial role in both
regards.
a. Supporting Prosecution Efforts
i. International Criminal Court
The ICC investigations and prosecutions of Ituri warlords
could represent an important step in ending the culture of im-
punity that has pervaded in DR Congo. By its absence from the
ICC, the United States is hampering a crucial Congolese human
rights initiative.231 In addition to assuring more effective results
for existing investigations and prosecutions, U.S. participation
could help facilitate ICC investigations related to crimes in other
parts of the country and committed by high-level perpetrators in
the government, military, and other sectors of society. For ex-
ample, it is perhaps time for the ICC to indict Laurent Nkunda
given DR Congo's collapsed judicial sector. Clearly, as indicated
above, Ituri is not the only area where atrocities have been com-
mitted over the past decade. Moreover, U.S. support could help
the ICC in the arrest and prosecution of indicted LRA leaders,
including chief Joseph Kony, whose forces have been commit-
ting atrocities in DR Congo since late last year.232
ii. Domestic Prosecutions
As a corollary, DR Congo domestic prosecution efforts must
also be buttressed. If he is not indicted by the ICC (and extra-
dited to DR Congo), Nkunda is the poster child for this neces-
sity. As mentioned above, U.S. agencies such as ICITAP and
OPDAT could lend significant assistance. These agencies could
spearhead efforts to place resources in the proper hands for jus-
tice sector rebuilding efforts. Further, the United States could
establish various programs, such as the State Department's "Re-
wards for Justice" program (already used effectively in Africa to
apprehend Rwandan gnocidaires on the lam) to help capture DR
Congo fugitives. 2
3 3
231. See generally Marcus R. Mumford, Building Upon a Foundation of Sand: A Com-
mentary on the International Criminal Court Treaty Conference, 8J. I-r'L. L. & PRAc. 151, 156
n.16 (noting generally that U.S. policy against the ICC is obstructing one of the primary
global human rights campaigns).
232. See LRA Rebels Commit New Atrocities, supra note 137.
233. The "Rewards forJustice" program has been used by the U.S. Department of
State to aid in the apprehension of human rights violators. See Allison Marston Danner,
2009] 1397
1398 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURVAL [Vol. 32:1361
iii. Establishing a Hybrid Tribunal?
Finally, to the extent atrocity crimes have been perpetrated
outside the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC (i.e., before July
2002)234 and are likewise beyond the competence of Congolese
authorities to investigate and prosecute, a separate international-
ized hybrid tribunal ought to be established.235 For effective and
systemic eradication of the culture of impunity, pre-2002 crimes
must also be dealt with.
b. Ensuring Enforcement of Human Rights &
Humanitarian Law
Committing U.S. troops to MONUC would certainly help
shore up enforcement of both human rights and humanitarian
law in DR Congo-an essential part of imposing and sustaining
the rule of law there. Even absent that, the United States should
provide assistance in training MONUC and Congolese troops in
the law of war. This would certainly help reduce victimization of
civilians and stem a rampant culture of predation.
CONCLUSION
During the first phase of Congolese independence, U.S.
policy was clearly dominated by narrow Cold War interests. But
as this Article has demonstrated, that policy has evolved over the
past decade. Although the United States has at times had diver-
gent objectives (including resource exploitation) and problem-
atic partners (including, most notably, Rwanda and Uganda) in
the Great Lakes Region during the previous ten years, its goal of
helping DR Congo emerge from the rubble of Mobutuism and
civil war has gained greater urgency and become a more promi-
nent and fixed part of U.S. strategy.2 36 Considering that 45,000
human beings still perish every month due to conflict in DR
Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International
Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510, 535 (2003) (describing how the program has
been used help bring Rwandan ginocidaires into custody).
234. See Pascal Kambale & Anna Rotman, The International Criminal Court and
Congo: Examining the Possibilities, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Oct. 2004, available at http://
www.crimesofwar.org/africa-mag/afr_05 kambale.html; see also Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court art. 11, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
235. Kambale & Rotman, supra note 234; see, e.g., James Cockayne, The Fraying
Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616 (2005).
236. See, e.g., James Traub, The Congo Case, N.Y. TIMIES MAG., July 3, 2005, at 35.
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Congo, it is high time that goal be completely achieved. Not
only is it the right thing to do and the best policy from a humani-
tarian perspective, it is in the U.S. and global interest that a
country the size of Western Europe, lying at the heart of the Afri-
can continent, attain stability.2 3 7 As the New York Times has
noted, "When Congo shakes, Africa trembles.
238
This Article has made a case for the United States imple-
menting with all due speed an "African Marshall Plan"-a mam-
moth infusion of resources and assistance. 239  This program
should be administered by a well-integrated, single agency or of-
fice within the U.S. government and use an ombudsman to in-
sure proper allocation and distribution of resources. As the orig-
inal aid initiative helped Western Europe cling to peace and de-
mocracy after the Second World War, the "African Marshall
Plan" should provide the same benefits for DR Congo in the
wake of Africa's "First World War." This behemoth of a country
is truly at a crossroads in its history. So is the United States as it
enters a new era with the presidency of Barack Obama, who was
born to an African father the year Lumumba was murdered with
American complicity.24 ° Perhaps the United States can now
come full circle. For it is still not too late for Patrice Lumumba's
vision of an independent, secure and prosperous Democratic Re-
public of Congo to be realized. If that is to happen, the spirit of
Lumumba and Marshall must now come together for the birth
of a new central Africa.
237. See Mark Bellamy, Weak States in Africa: U.S. Policy Options in the Democratic
Republic of Congo: Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
African Affairs, Apr. 9, 2002 (Statement of Mark Bellamy, Principal Deputy Asst. Sec'y
for Afr. Aff.), available at http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/9313.htm (explaining
that, in light of major humanitarian crisis in DR Congo destabilizing much of Africa, it
is in the best interests of the United States to restore stability to the Great Lakes region,
ameliorate the humanitarian crisis, promote a democratic government and respect for
human rights, and promote economic development and reform).
238. See generally Gettleman, supra note 130.
239. See Gerald LeMelle, Africa Policy Outlook 2008, FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus, Feb.
7, 2008, available at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4949 (urging the United States to em-
brace an African strategy that invests in socioeconomic infrastructure, champions fair
terms of trade for African products, and promotes sustainable economic development
that addresses the aspirations and welfare of the African people).
240. See Meet the Candidate, Barackobama.com, http://www.barackobama.com/
learn/meetbarack.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (noting that Barack Obama was
born in Hawaii on August 4, 1961 to a Kenyan father).
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